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Abstract: A widely assumed limitation on the distribution of negative polarity items (NPIs) is that they
must be c-commanded by a trigger. Scrutiny of this limitation reveals, however, that c-command by
a trigger is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on the distribution of NPIs. The failure of c-
command to serve as the basis for an account of the syntactic distribution of NPIs is taken here as the
impetus to pursue an alternative approach, one in terms of scope and linear order instead of c-command.
A particular concept of scope is established that serves as the key notion for characterizing the syntactic
relationship between NPIs and their triggers. Scope is defined in a dependency grammar (DG) theory of
syntax in terms of scope domains. The catena unit plays an important role. Given the notions of scope
put forward, it is possible to discern two conditions on the syntactic distribution of NPIs.
Keywords: catena; constituent; dependency grammar; negative polarity item; scope; scope domain
1. Problems with a c-command account of polarity licensing
Textbook wisdom states that a negative polarity item (NPI) must be
c-commanded by its trigger (e.g., Radford 1997, 113–114; Fromkin et al.
2000, 223; Poole 2002, 51; Adger 2003, 121; Sobin 2011, 72–73; Carnie
2013, 224: Sportiche et al. 2014, 311–312).1 The c-command restriction on
the distribution of NPIs concerns the configurational relationship between
1 The sources just cited are linguistics and syntax textbooks. The stance that an NPI
must be (c-)commanded by a trigger is also common in detailed polarity investigations
(e.g., Klima 1964, 297; Linebarger 1987, 328; Laka 1994, 21; Progovac 1993, 2; van
der Wouden 1997, 165; de Swart 1998, 177–8; Lasnik 1999, 12; Giannakidou 2011,
1163).
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licensor (trigger) and licensee (NPI).2 Data like the following appear to
motivate the c-command constraint:
a.(1) Nobody said anything.
b. *Anybody said nothing.
c. *Any student had not written the manuscript.
a.(2) Frank never gets up when anybody expects him to.
b. *Frank ever gets up when nobody expects him to.
c. *When nobody expects him to, Frank ever gets up.
d. *When anybody expects him to, Frank never gets up.
Given standard assumptions about phrase structure, the negation c-com-
mands the NPI any in the acceptable a-sentences, but it fails to c-command
the NPI any or ever in the other sentences. It is therefore understandable
how the c-command restriction has become a pillar of the theory of polarity
distribution.
In other cases, there is clearly no surface c-command relation between
the trigger and the NPI, yet licensing is successful:3
(3) Bill spoke with nobody about anything.
(4) During nobody’s presentation did I say anything.
a.(5) No student’s parent posed any questions.
b. The parent of no student posed any questions.
(6) She said nothing at any time.
In (3)–(4), the complement of the preposition does not c-command out
of the PP. In (4)–(5), the negation no(body) does not c-command out
of the encompassing nominal group. In (6), the object nothing does not
2 For easy reference, the main abbreviations and schematic devices are listed here in
one spot: c-command = constituent command; DG = dependency grammar; FCI =
free choice item; NPI = negative polarity item; PSG = phrase structure grammar;
[…] marks the scope of a negation or of some other item in general, and f…g marks
the scope of an NPI.
3 A canonical definition of c-command is as follows (Reinhart 1976, 32):
(i) C-command
A node N1 c-commands a node N2 if and only if neither N1 nor N2 dominates
the other, and the first branching node to dominate N1 also dominates N2.
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– assuming a traditional left-branching VP structure to accommodate the
adjunct at any time – c-command any in the adjunct.
It has long been known that a surface c-command licensing condi-
tion for NPIs cannot be correct (e.g., Linebarger 1980; Uribe-Etxebarria
1994; Giannakidou 1998; de Swart 1998; Hoeksema 2000). What is gen-
erally accepted, however, is that an NPI must occur in the scope of its
licensor (e.g., Merchant 2000, 147). Authors within the Minimalist tradi-
tion generally assume that an item’s scope corresponds to its c-command
domain at a level of Logical Form (LF) derived from the surface configu-
ration by movement of scope-bearing elements. Thus, in (3), for example,
since nobody takes scope over the entire sentence, it is assumed to undergo
movement (Quantifier Raising or QR; e.g., May 1985; Fox 2000) to a po-
sition c-commanding the rest of the sentence at LF, including the NPI
anything. The LF c-command approach can directly account for successful
NPI-licensing in examples such as (3) and (6). On the other hand, the
examples in (4)–(5) are more problematic, as movement of the trigger to
a position c-commanding the NPI would violate island constraints (some
combination of adjunct, subject and/or definite NP islands, depending on
one’s assumptions about the relevant structures). At the very least, this
suggests that neither surface nor LF c-command can be considered a nec-
essary condition on NPI-licensing. Furthermore, examples like (1b) suggest
that LF c-command could not be a sufficient condition either: QR should
be able to move nothing to a position that c-commands the rest of the
sentence, including anybody, yet the example is unacceptable.4
A different type of challenge to the c-command restriction on the
distribution of NPIs is posed by data of the following sort:
(7) It was clear that a student with any knowledge of syntax had not written the
manuscript.
(8) That anyone had actually passed was not seriously considered.
(9) …but all that happy, she clearly was not.
(10) …but at all satisfied, he obviously was not.
4 It has been suggested that examples such as (1b) can be ruled out through an anti-c-
command condition holding of surface syntax (e.g., Heycock & Kroch 2002, 155; Reeve
2012, 44–45), but this will face problems with such cases as *A picture of anybody
impressed no one, which can be handled by the Precedence Condition proposed here
(see especially section 5).
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The negation not now follows the NPI and also appears to the right of the
matrix finite auxiliary, a position from which it clearly does not c-com-
mand the NPI in surface syntax. These examples show that an alternative
account in terms of linear order alone is untenable, but they also raise
difficulties for the c-command approach. Once again, one might seek to
address data such as these by imposing an LF c-command requirement on
NPIs. For example, it is generally assumed in Minimalist syntax (follow-
ing, e.g., Koopman & Sportiche 1991) that subjects underlyingly occupy
a position within the VP (or vP, following Chomsky 1995), and are hence
c-commanded by sentential negation at this level. Given the further as-
sumption that movement leaves a ‘copy’ of the subject inside VP (e.g.,
Chomsky 1995), the c-command constraint on the NPIs in (7)–(8) would
be satisfied by this lower copy (‘reconstruction’). Yet this approach has no
obvious way of distinguishing acceptable examples such as (7)–(10) from
unacceptable examples such as (1c), where reconstruction of the subject
NP should satisfy the c-command requirement at LF.
The message so far is therefore that c-command (whether on the sur-
face or at LF) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on the
distribution of NPIs.5 Given this state of affairs, an alternative approach
is warranted, one that builds on some other aspect of the syntactic config-
uration. The dependency grammar (DG) approach presented below does
this in terms of the scope domain, the definition of which is given here
now for orientation:
(11) Scope domain
The minimal constituent containing (part of) a syntactic predicate P (that is not
preceded and dominated by any other part of P ) and any argument of P that domi-
nates P .
Given this notion, the scope of a given non-predicative item X is defined
as follows:
5 Indeed, even the notion of ‘semantic scope’ is not a sufficient condition for NPI-
licensing, as has been discussed in the literature (e.g., Linebarger 1987):
(i) ??I didn’t add that there was any food in the refrigerator. (op.cit., 376)
(ii) ??She did not scream that anyone should help her.
(iii) *It did not upset us that any of our pets had destroyed another pair of shoes.
In examples (i)–(iii), the negation c-commands the NPI any in the object clause,
yet acceptability is degraded significantly. Such data are therefore another source of
difficulties for most c-command-based approaches to NPI-licensing.
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(12) Scope of X (where X is not predicative)
The scope domain established by the first/lowest predicate to directly or indirectly
govern X.
These notions allow one to discern two necessary, but not sufficient, con-
ditions on the distribution of NPIs:
(13) Scope Condition
An NPI must appear within the scope of a trigger.
(14) Precedence Condition
i. An iota-type NPI must follow its trigger.
ii. An any-type NPI must follow its trigger unless its scope is (contained in) an
argument of the predicate that establishes a trigger’s scope.6
These two conditions combine to serve as the foundation upon which a
DG theory of syntactic distribution of NPIs can be constructed. The two
conditions are, however, merely necessary – they are not also sufficient.
This means that they do not account for the numerous idiosyncrasies as-
sociated with the distribution of individual NPIs and individual licensors
of NPIs (see Hoeksema 2017 for a recent overview and critical discussion
of previous approaches). The Scope Condition expresses the fundamental
insight that an NPI must appear in the scope of its trigger. The Precedence
Condition is an additional condition that holds of some, but not all, NPIs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 distinguishes between
types of NPIs: predicative vs non-predicative and iota- vs. any-type. Sec-
tion 3 presents the DG approach to syntax in which our alternative ac-
count of the distribution of NPIs is couched. Section 4 presents the scope
domain unit and the general understanding of scope based on it. Section 5
establishes the validity of the two conditions just mentioned, the Scope
Condition and the Precedence Condition. Section 6 considers additional
sources of support demonstrating the potential of the scope domain unit
for establishing a greater theory of scope. Section 7 concludes the paper.
6 More precisely, an any-type NPI must follow its trigger unless its scope is reflexively
contained in an argument of the predicate that establishes a trigger’s scope.
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2. Classifying NPIs
The aim of this section is to establish a classification of NPIs with a view
to delineating the empirical focus of the article. Two criteria are crucial
in this classification: linearity, a primary criterion, and clausematiness,
a secondary criterion. On the basis of these two criteria, we distinguish
between predicative and non-predicative NPIs, and, within the latter sub-
type, between iota- and any-type NPIs. Predicative NPIs are subject to
clausematiness but not linearity, while one type of non-predicative NPIs,
iota-type NPIs, are subject to both clausematiness and linearity. The other
type of non-predicative NPIs, any-type NPIs, are sometimes subject to
clausematiness and/or linearity and sometimes not. Because of their more
complicated distribution, any-type NPIs pose a particularly difficult chal-
lenge for theories of NPI-licensing, and it is therefore this class that we
mainly focus on in this article. Section 2 closes with a brief discussion of
the free choice item (FCI) any, which must be distinguished from NPI any.
2.1. The relevance of linear order: predicative vs. non-predicative NPIs
A number of linguists have observed (e.g., de Swart 1998, 179–180; van
der Wouden 1997, 172; Hoeksema 2000, 130–131) that there is a class
of NPIs that seem to be free of any linearity constraints. De Swart calls
them ‘non-quantifier’ NPIs, and Hoeksema calls them ‘verbal’ and ‘predica-
tive’ NPIs. The following examples are taken from Hoeksema (2000, 131):
a.(15) Carla could stand it no more.
b. Al could abide none of it.
c. Frieda stopped at nothing.
These examples involve the verbal NPIs modal+stand, modal+abide, and
stop at. Since each of these examples has the NPI preceding the negation,
it is again difficult to see how such cases can be interpreted in terms of
c-command (taking into account the discussion of QR accounts above).
Hoeksema (2000) observes in this area that “as long as the clause in which
the modal appears is negated, the result is grammatical”. He then con-
cludes that c-command is not relevant for the distribution of verbal NPIs.
The following examples illustrate the point further:
a.(16) Fey cares for none of these rice cakes.
b. *Fey cares for rice cakes.
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a.(17) Larry gave a damn at no point during the process.
b. *Larry gave a damn during the process.
a.(18) She lifted a finger for no one.
b. *She lifted a finger for you.
a.(19) You need not do that.
b. *You need do that.
The b-sentence is included each time to demonstrate that the negation in
the a-sentence is indeed licensing the NPI. Since the negation follows the
NPI, one can conclude that these NPIs are not sensitive to linear order.
The class of NPIs that behave in this way is quite large. What follows
is a list of such NPIs that have been collected from the literature:
(20) Predicative NPIs
bear, budge an inch, modal+abide, modal+fathom, modal+help, modal+possibly,
modal+seem, modal+stand, care for, dare, do a thing, drink a drop, faze, give a
damn, give a shit, have the foggiest (idea), have/be a snowball’s chance in hell, hurt a
fly, last long, lift a finger, mind, my cup of tea, need, sleep a wink, modal+stomach,
stop at, would dream
This list could certainly be expanded. The key trait that these NPIs all
have in common is that each of them represents a predicate. These NPIs
are hence called predicative because they establish the predicate-argument
structures in which they appear. From a syntactic point of view, predicative
NPIs are less challenging because their distribution is not sensitive to linear
order; they are immune to the constraint on linear order that is illustrated
with the next set of examples (22)–(27).
Another class of NPIs are non-predicative. A non-predicative NPI
does not establish the predicate-argument structure in which it appears;
the role it plays in clause structure is secondary. The list of non-predicative
NPIs that we have collected from the literature on NPIs is comparatively
small, consisting mostly of minimizers:
(21) Non-predicative NPIs
a soul, all that, any, at all, either, even, ever, in the least, in the slightest, in X (time
length), let alone, much less, one iota, too, until X (point in time), yet
Despite the fact that the list of non-predicative NPIs is noticeably shorter,
the attention that they have received in the literature on polarity is much
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greater than for predicative NPIs. Furthermore, the distribution of a cer-
tain subclass of non-predicative NPIs (all that, at all, any, ever, etc.,
called any-type NPIs here) has generated particular interest and has led to
the claim that a c-command restriction holds of the distribution of NPIs
in general.
Most non-predicative NPIs are indeed sensitive to linearity in a way
that predicative NPIs are not. As illustrated with examples (1)–(2) above,
non-predicative NPIs often cannot precede their triggers. Here are some
further examples:
a.(22) He did not help one iota.
b. *One iota, he did not help.
a.(23) She did not protest in the least.
b. *In the least, she did not protest.
a.(24) He couldn’t do it in three years.
b. *In three years, he couldn’t do it.
a.(25) The adults did not like it, let alone the children.
b. *Let alone the children, the adults did not like it.
a.(26) They will not arrive until tomorrow.
b. *Until tomorrow, they will not arrive.
a.(27) We have not ever considered that.
b. *We have ever not considered that.
These examples demonstrate that the non-predicative NPIs one iota, in
the least, in three years, let alone, until X (time interval), and ever cannot
precede the negation that would trigger them. While there are important
exceptions to this constraint on some non-predicative NPIs – which are
examined and discussed below in sections 5.2 and 5.3 – the greater ob-
servation is that the linear order of an NPI and its trigger impacts the
distribution of many non-predicative NPIs in an important way.7
7 There may be a class of non-predicative NPIs that require the NPI to precede the
negation. This seems to be true of heel ‘whole’ in Dutch (Den Dikken 2002; Hoeksema
2017) and beileibe ‘really’ in German (Richter & Soehn 2006, 427).
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2.2. The relevance of clausematiness: iota- vs. any-type NPIs
At times, an NPI and its trigger must be clausemates. Such NPIs are called
strict (Horn 1975; Collins & Postal 2014; Hoeksema 2017, 38–41). If a given
NPI is not strict, then it is called non-strict. Many, if not all, of the pred-
icative NPIs listed above are strict, and many of the non-predicative NPIs
listed above are also strict. However, the NPIs any and ever, which have
received the most attention in the literature on polarity, are non-strict.
Clausematiness, which is the basis for the strict vs. non-strict distinction,
serves here as a second criterion for classifying NPIs. Given both linearity
and clausematiness, a typology of NPIs is possible that allows key distri-
butional characteristics of diverse NPI types to be captured.
The next examples illustrate the basic distinction between strict and
non-strict non-predicative NPIs. Examples (28)–(30) involve strict NPIs:
a.(28) Frank did not lift a finger.
b. *They did not say that Frank lifted a finger.
a.(29) Susan did not drink a drop.
b. *We did not say that Susan drank a drop.
a.(30) Esther did not help one iota.
b. *He did not say that Esther helped one iota.
The next examples illustrate non-strict NPIs:
a.(31) Frank did not do anything.
b. They did not say that Frank did anything.
a.(32) Susan did not ever drink alcohol.
b. We did not say that Susan ever drank alcohol.
a.(33) Esther did not help at all.
b. He did not say that Esther helped at all.
Examples (28)–(30) illustrate the fact that the NPIs lift a finger, drink a
drop, and one iota need a clausemate trigger, whereas examples (31–33)
demonstrate that the NPIs any, ever, and at all do not need a clausemate
trigger inasmuch as the trigger can be in a superordinate clause. This dif-
ference in strictness serves here as the criterion for distinguishing between
two subtypes of non-predicative NPIs, called iota-type NPIs and any-type
NPIs here:
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a.(34) Iota-type NPIs
a soul, either, even, in the least, in the slightest, in X (time length), let alone,
much less, one iota, too, until X (point in time)
b. Any-type NPIs
all that, any, at all, ever, yet
The noteworthy aspect about this distinction is that the majority of ex-
amples in the literature on polarity (including the textbook accounts cited
at the very start of this article) use any-type NPIs, mainly any and ever,
to illustrate aspects of polarity distribution. The list of any-type NPIs is,
however, quite small. Nevertheless, the account of NPI distribution de-
veloped here also focuses primarily on the distribution of any-type NPIs.
The reason for this is that, of the various types of NPIs mentioned, the
distribution of any-type NPIs is the most challenging to investigate and
discern with certainty.
2.3. Neg-raising
The nature of so-called negative raising (neg-raising) (Fillmore 1963;
Horn 1971; 1975; Collins & Postal 2014; Hoeksema 2017) and the predi-
cates that license it (e.g., appear, believe, seem, suppose, etc.) is important
for verifying key aspects of the typology just established. Neg-raising predi-
cates allow a negation appearing in the matrix clause to result in a meaning
that is almost synonymous with the corresponding sentence in which the
negation appears in the embedded clause; for example:
a.(35) John does not believe that he passed the exam.
b. John believes that he did not pass the exam.
These two sentences are essentially synonymous (though cf. Horn’s fore-
word to Collins & Postal 2014, ix). This is a bit surprising in view of
the fact that predicates of speaking and saying, which are similar to be-
lieve in taking an object clause and which behave as ‘bridge’ verbs for
wh-dependencies (e.g., Chomsky 1977), do not allow this; for example:
a.(36) John did not say that he passed the exam.
b. John said that he did not pass the exam.
These two sentences are now transparently non-synonymous. The meaning
of sentence (36a) is consistent with a situation in which John said nothing
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at all, whereas sentence (36b) makes it clear that John definitely said
something.
In the current context, the relevant aspect of neg-raising predicates
(and other non-factive predicates; see Hoeksema 2017) concerns the extent
to which strict NPIs (see the immediately preceding section) can appear
in an embedded clause when the trigger appears in a superordinate clause;
for example:
a.(37) I don’t think Sam gives a shit.
b. I think Sam doesn’t give a shit.
Despite the fact that the strict NPI give a shit appears in the object clause,
it can still be licensed by the negation in the matrix clause. In other words,
the acceptability of (37a) is surprising insofar as the strict NPI gives a shit
and the negation are not clausemates. This acceptability stands in contrast
to similar examples involving, again, a verb of speaking:
a.(38) *Sam did not state that he gives a shit.
b. Sam stated that he doesn’t give a shit.
The unacceptability of (38a) is now expected given that the strict NPI gives
a shit and not are not clausemates. Apparently, the nature of neg-raising
predicates is such that the object clause they take is relatively transparent
for purposes of polarity licensing.8
This liberal nature of neg-raising predicates can be accessed to consol-
idate the distinction established in the previous section between iota- and
any-type NPIs. Even though iota-type NPIs are strict, the prediction is
that, given a neg-raising predicate in the matrix clause, a matrix negation
should nevertheless be able to license an iota-type NPI appearing in the
object clause (in the same way that it can license the predicative NPI give
a shit in the object clause). This prediction is borne out, as the a-sentences
8 The fact that the clausemate condition can be violated with neg-raising predicates
has been taken to support a transformational analysis of neg-raising, as originally
proposed by Fillmore (1963) (e.g., Lakoff 1969; Collins & Postal 2014). In addition,
Collins and Postal (2014) cite the fact that the relation between trigger and NPI
is subject to island constraints, which they argue “does not follow from any known
pragmatic approach to [neg-raising]” (2014, 4). Hoeksema (2017), however, argues
that there are independent explanations for the data that Collins and Postal adduce,
and furthermore, he shows that long-distance licensing of strict NPIs is sometimes
possible with non-neg-raising non-factive predicates. He concludes that some version
of Giannakidou’s (1998) non-veridicality requirement would seem to be sufficient to
handle the variation in long-distance licensing, a position we find convincing.
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in the next examples illustrate. Interestingly, however, the object clause
containing the iota-type NPI cannot be fronted:
a.(39) Sam does not think that they cheated in the least.
b. *That they cheated in the least, Sam does not think.
a.(40) We do not believe that Jane will leave until tomorrow.
b. *That Jane will leave until tomorrow, we do not believe.
a.(41) Sue does not think that she solved problem 1, let alone problem 2.
b. *That she solved problem 1, let alone problem 2, Sue does not think.
In contrast, topicalization is possible if an any-type NPI is present instead
of an iota-type NPI:
a.(42) Sam does not think that they cheated at all.
b. That they cheated at all, Sam does not think.
a.(43) We do not believe that Jane will ever leave.
b. That Jane will ever leave, we do not believe.
a.(44) Sue does not think that she solved any of the problems.
b. That she solved any of the problems, Sue does not think.
Hoeksema (2017, exx. (20)–(21)) notes this difference in the potential to
topicalize, although he does not use the nomenclature employed here (iota-
vs. any-type NPI). The data consolidate the distinction between iota- and
any-type NPIs. The two NPI types are distinct in their distributions.9
To summarize the discussion in this section and the previous two
sections, the current account of NPI distribution acknowledges two main
types of NPIs, one of which can be further subdivided into two subtypes
(Table 1). As noted above, it is any-type NPIs that have constituted the
focus of most previous work on NPI-licensing. Before concluding this ty-
pology of NPIs, a brief discussion of free choice any is necessary in order
to avoid confusion between the two types of any.
9 A reviewer notes, attributing the observation to A. Giannakidou, that there appears
to be a correlation between locality and linearity (or overt c-command under the
reviewer’s assumptions), which we formulate as follows: for a given NPI type X, if X
must be a clausemate of its trigger, then X must follow its trigger. We note that this
correlation would follow from our proposal (in particular, the Precedence Condition)
if in cases of neg-raising the negation’s scope domain were coextensive with that of
the embedded trigger, but we leave elaboration of this idea for future work.
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2.4. Free choice any
A source of confusion when discussing the NPI any in English is the fact
that it is homophonous with FCI any. We know, however, that NPI any
and FCI any are distinct, because in many other languages such words are
not homophonous, as established in the works of Giannakidou in particular
(e.g., Giannakidou 1998; 2001; Giannakidou & Cheng 2006). In fact, their
distributions are distinct even in English: NPI any is often licensed by a
negation, whereas FCI any is typically licensed by a modal verb, generic
present tense, or a post-modifier (as in the phenomenon that LeGrand
1975 calls ‘subtrigging’). Interestingly, the two types of any are generally
in complementary distribution; for example:
a.(45) Spicer has not insulted anyone. – NPI any
b. *Spicer has not insulted almost anyone.
c. *…but anyone, Spicer has not insulted.
a.(46) Spicer would insult anyone. – FCI any
b. Spicer would insult almost anyone.
c. ?…but almost anyone Spicer would insult.
As shown in the b-sentences, when almost can modify any-, any- is an FCI
(Carlson 1981). The c-sentences illustrate further that if topicalization of
any- alone is (at least marginally) possible, any- is again an FCI.
The most important aspect of FCI any in the current context is that,
like the predicative NPIs listed above, it is insensitive to linear order. That
this is so is most evident in simple examples like the following:
a.(47) Anyone would insult Spicer.
b. Almost anyone would insult Spicer.
The acceptance of modification by almost in (47b) identifies any- in (47a)
as FCI any. The modal verb would must be responsible for licensing any-
in (47a), since the simple past indicative would be unacceptable: *Anyone
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insulted Spicer. What this means in the current context is that FCI any
is like predicative NPIs inasmuch as it is not sensitive to the linearity
constraints that restrict the distribution of non-predicative NPIs.
Since predicative NPIs and FCI any are not sensitive to linear order
in the same way as non-predicative NPIs, accounting for their distribution
is less challenging. (In our terms, FCIs must satisfy the Scope Condition,
but need not satisfy the Precedence Condition). The exploration of po-
larity items below focuses primarily on non-predicative NPIs. To avoid
potential confounds with FCI any, episodic simple past is used in most of
the examples, as FCI any is generally incompatible with episodic simple
past tense; e.g., *Anyone insulted Spicer. This ensures that the occurrence
of any in the acceptable examples below must be construed as NPI any.
3. Dependency Grammar (DG)
The following sections establish central aspects of the dependency gram-
mar (DG) theory of syntax in which our account of polarity distribution
is couched.
3.1. Principles of dependency syntax
The account of polarity distribution developed here is couched in a depen-
dency grammar (DG) approach to syntax. Like most DGs, the DG here
assumes that the units of syntax are organized in accordance with the
following three principles:
Three principles of syntactic organization
1. One-to-one mapping,
2. Strict headedness, and
3. Hierarchical organization in terms of trees
The first principle posits a strict correspondence between atomic units of
syntax (e.g., words) and nodes in the hierarchical structure. Each atomic
unit corresponds to a single node, and vice versa (see Mel’čuk 1979, 96;
Mel’čuk et al. 1987, 48, 57–58; Kahane 1996, 45; Schubert 1987, 78–86, 129;
Engel 1994, 25, 28; Bröker 2003, 297; Hudson 2003, 520; Hudson 2007, 183;
Carnie 2010, 177). The second principle excludes the possibility of complex
syntactic units that are headless. In other words, all units of syntax are
endocentric. The third principle guarantees that cycles do not occur in the
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hierarchy of structure. Each word necessarily has one and only one parent
– barring the root node, which has no parent at all.10
A fourth principle is also assumed here:
Fourth principle of syntactic organization
4. Monostratal syntax such that dominance and precedence are both
primitive.
Some DGs do not adhere to this fourth principle. For instance, Tesnière
(1959, 11–13) assumed that the units of syntax are first organized in terms
of government (dominance) in the mind of a speaker, and that precedence
relations are then derived from the government relations by the speaker.
Further, Mel’čuk’s (1988; 2003) Meaning-Text Theory (MTT) assumes two
levels of syntax, a deep level and a surface level, and linear order is absent
from both – it first appears at the morphological level(s) of organization.
Other DGs, in contrast, do not separate linear order from hierarchical
order, such as Hudson’s Word Grammar (Hudson 1984; 1990; 2007; 2010)
and Starosta’s Lexicase Grammar (Starosta 1988; 2003). In this article,
however, we assume a monostratal DG without further comment, as this
would take us too far afield.
The four principles of syntactic organization just listed result in hier-
archical analyses of phrases and clauses such as the following a-structures.
The corresponding phrase structure analyses are given as the b-examples;
they are included as a point of comparison:
(48)
(49)
10 Richard Hudson’s Word Grammar (Hudson 1984; 1990; 2007; 2010) is a prominent
DG that does not adhere to hierarchical organization in terms of trees. A given word
in Word Grammar analyses often has multiple parents. Word Grammar is unlike most
other DGs in this regard.
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(50)
(51)
The dependency analyses given in the a-structures can be translated di-
rectly into the corresponding phrase structure analyses given with the
b-structures, and vice versa. This translation back and forth is possible
due to the assumption of entirely endocentric, relatively flat phrase struc-
tures, as shown with the b-trees. For instance, the sentence is taken to be
a big VP in (51b) and this VP is divided into three constituents, instead
of just two.
3.2. Rising
Since some of the data presented in the introduction and explored further
below involve displacement, the approach to discontinuities assumed here
will now be sketched; that is, the discussion will consider the means by
which common discontinuities – also known as long-distance dependencies
– associated with extraposition, scrambling, topicalization, and wh-fronting
are addressed. A fuller account of the theory of discontinuities we pursue is
presented in Osborne et al. (2012) and especially Groß & Osborne (2009).
A number of DGs address, or suggest addressing, discontinuities in
terms of a flattening of structure (Schubert 1987, 190; Lobin 1993, 31–35;
Heringer 1996, 261; Bröker 1999, 55–59; 2003, 294; Eroms & Heringer
2003, 260; Starosta 2003, 276–279; Groß & Osborne 2009). A displaced
constituent takes on a word as its head that is not its governor.11 This
11 The current theory draws a major distinction between heads and governors. The
head of a given word is the one word that immediately dominates it, whereas the
governor of a given word is the one word that licenses its appearance. In continuous
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phenomenon is called rising here, a notion to be understood metaphori-
cally. When a constituent is separated from its governor by material that
dominates its governor, crossing lines can obtain in the dependency tree.
The crossing lines identify a projectivity violation. By assuming rising, the
crossing lines are no longer present and the projectivity violation disap-
pears. The result is an entirely projective DG.
The rising analysis of an instance of wh-fronting, an instance of top-
icalization, an instance of scrambling from German, and an instance of
extraposition are now presented. The a-trees illustrate the crossing lines
(projectivity violations) of discontinuities, and the b-trees show how these




structures (i.e., where there are no discontinuities), the head and the governor of a
given word are always the same one word. When a discontinuity is present, however,
the head and the governor of the displaced unit are distinct.
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(55)
In (52a) the crossing lines are those of a wh-fronting discontinuity, in (53a)
those of a topicalization discontinuity, in (54a) those of a scrambling dis-
continuity, and in (55a) those of an extraposition discontinuity.
The crossing lines are absent in the b-trees, where the displaced con-
stituent has taken on a word as its head that is not its governor. The dis-
placed constituent is said to have risen, although the notion is, as stated
above, merely a convenient metaphor. The risen constituent is identified
using a dashed dependency edge. The g-subscript marks the governor of
the risen constituent.
3.3. Catenae
The minimal structures of DG allow one to acknowledge certain word
combinations as concrete units of syntax that are less visible in grammars
that assume phrase structure. These word combinations are called catenae
(Latin for ‘chains’; singular catena). The ability to acknowledge catenae is
due in part to the vivid representation of hierarchical order that depen-
dency enables, since dependency links the words of sentences directly to
each other in hierarchies – in contrast, phrase structure syntax uses ad-
ditional nodes, the purely phrasal nodes, which mediate in the hierarchy
between the words. Osborne et al. (2012) argue that the catena unit is
the fundamental unit of syntactic analysis, not the constituent. The con-
stituent is of course also important, but it is a less inclusive unit than
the catena.
The catena unit is defined here together with the string and con-
stituent units. The three are given together in order to increase under-
standing through comparison.
(56) String
A word or a combination of words that is continuous with respect to precedence.
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(57) Catena
A word or a combination of words that is continuous with respect to dominance.12
(58) Constituent
A word or a combination of words that form a complete subtree.
This definition of the constituent here is consistent with its definition in
phrase structure grammars (PSGs) when defined over phrase structure
trees; a constituent is a node plus all the nodes that that node dominates
(for similar definitions, see for instance Kroeger 2005, 40; Tallerman 2005,
136; Carnie 2010, 37; Sportiche et al. 2014, 47). Some DGs have also offered
such a definition of the constituent unit, but over dependency structures
(e.g., Hudson 1984, 92; Starosta 1988, 105; Hellwig 2003, 603; Anderson
2011, 92).
The following dependency tree is used to illustrate the three units:
(59)
The capital letters abbreviate the words. All the distinct strings, catenae,
and constituents in (59) are listed next:
(60) 36 distinct strings in (59)
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, AB, BC, CD, DE, EF, FG, FH, ABC, BCD, CDE, DEF,
EFG, FGH, ABCD, BCDE, CDEF, DEFG, EFGH, ABCDE, BCDEF,
CDEFG, DEFGH, ABCDEF, BCDEFG, CDEFGH, ABCDEFG, BCDEFGH, and
ABCDEFGH .
12 Note that we give a non-formal definition of the catena unit here in order to aid the
comparison/contrast with the string unit. A set-theoretic definition of the catena is
as follows:
(i) Catena (set-theoretic definition)
Given a dependency tree T, a catena is a set of nodes N in T such that
exactly one node in N is not immediately dominated by another node in N.
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(61) 45 distinct catenae in (59)
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, AB, BC, CE, DE, EF, FH, GH, ABC, BCE, CDE, CEF,
DEF, EFH, FGH, ABCE, BCDE, BCEF, CDEF, CEFH, DEFH, EFGH, ABCDE,
ABCEF, BCDEF, BCEFH, CDEFH, CEFGH, DEFGH, ABCDEF, ABCEFH,
BCDEFH, BCEFGH, CDEFGH, ABCDEFH, ABCEFGH, BCDEFGH, and
ABCDEFGH.
(62) 8 distinct constituents in (59)
A, D, G, AB, GH, FGH, DEFGH, and ABCDEFGH.
Note that some strings are not catenae (e.g., CD, BCD, DEFG, etc.) and
that some catenae are not strings (e.g., CE, FH, CEF, etc.). The number
of DG constituents listed, just eight, is approximately half as many as
the corresponding phrase structure tree would contain. Hence the number
of catenae in (59) is more than double the number of phrase structure
constituents that one might assume for the structure (16 vs. 45). In this
regard, the catena is a much more inclusive and flexible unit of syntax than
the constituent. Furthermore, every constituent listed is of course also a
catena. This observation is true of phrase structure constituents as well:
every phrase structure constituent is a catena. Hence the constituent, be
it a DG or PSG constituent, is a subtype of catena.
3.4. Predicates and arguments
The understanding of predicates and arguments assumed here overlaps to
an extent with that of Napoli (1989), and it is largely consistent with Ack-
erman and Webelhuth’s (1998) lengthy exploration of predicates. It is also
consistent with the understanding of predicates that one encounters in the
grammar tradition of the German language (e.g., Tarvainen 1981, 36–40;
Helbig & Buscha 1998, 536–543). This tradition views the main predicate
of a clause as consisting of a content verb and any pure auxiliary verbs that
are also present, or of a copular verb and a predicative expression. Note
that such an understanding of predicates is contrary to the understand-
ing of predicates that is dominant in the modern tradition of the English
language, where a predicate is deemed to be everything in a clause except
the subject. These two competing views of predicates correspond to the
DG vs. PSG distinction. Most PSGs begin with a binary division of the
clause into a subject and a predicate, whereas DGs reject this division,
positioning the verb as the clause root instead.
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A DG approach that acknowledges catenae can also acknowledge the
presence of predicates and arguments in sentence structure in a concrete
way, in a way that is less straightforward for PSGs. Most of the time, the
words that constitute a predicate form a catena in sentence structure, and
the argument(s) of that predicate are also catenae. This state of affairs will
now be illustrated using various examples. Simplified predicate-calculus
representations that cling to the surface forms of words are employed to
identify predicates and their arguments.
The matrix predicate of a clause usually includes one or more verbs;
for example:
(63)
These examples illustrate the manner in which the verbs of the main clause
predicate form a catena, and in the case of (63b–c), we see that the id-
iomatic expression give a hard time forms a catena with any auxiliary verbs
that are present, despite the fact that gave/give/given and a hard time do
not form a string each time due to the intervening object argument Sue.
The flexibility of the catena unit allows the approach to acknowledge
word combinations as predicates that clearly would not qualify as con-
stituents in a PSG; for example:
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(64)
The copula is forms a catena with the following preposition in (64a), and
the copula was forms a catena with the following subordinator before in
(64b). This state of affairs allows the account to acknowledge is in as the
matrix predicate in (64a) and was before as the matrix predicate in (64b).
The current analysis of predicates and their arguments can account
directly for the manner in which many adjuncts are predications over the
entire rest of the clause; for example:
(65)
Following a number of DGs (e.g., Tesnière 1959, 36; Baum 1976, 79; Tar-
vainen 1981, 61; Engel 1994, 44; Jung 1995, 111–116; Eroms 2000, 85–86;
Mel’čuk 2003, 193; Uzonyi 2003, 237), adjuncts are identified in depen-
dency trees using a special visual device. While the particular convention
for this varies among DGs, the current DG positions an arrow dependency
edge pointing away from the adjunct towards the adjunct’s governor. The
arrow indicates that semantic selection is operating in the opposite direc-
tion to normal; the adjunct semantically selects its governor rather than
vice versa.
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The modal adverb probably predicates over the entire sentence, so its
argument is the rest of the sentence. Similarly, the locational preposition
under is a predicate that establishes a relationship between our dog eats
and the stairs. These examples illustrate well the fact that while the ar-
gument of a given predicate is often not a constituent, it is nevertheless
a catena. Each of the predicates and arguments shown in the examples
throughout this section is a catena.
The current approach also acknowledges predicates used attributively
inside NPs; for example:
(66)
The predicates lengthy, angry, and upset are being used attributively. De-
spite this fact, they appear as catenae in the structure, and their arguments
also appear as catenae.
There are of course many aspects of predicates and their arguments
that are not addressed here. The message at present is merely that by
acknowledging the catena unit, an approach to predicate-argument struc-
tures has become available that is not possible for theories of syntax that
take the constituent to be the fundamental unit of syntax. Predicates and
their arguments are now manifest in sentence structure in a concrete way.
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3.5. Syntactic vs. semantic predicates
The examples just considered demonstrate that verbs, adjectives, certain
prepositions, and certain subordinators are or can be predicates. The ex-
tent to which nouns can be predicates has yet to be established. Cer-
tainly, when nouns are used predicatively, they are (part of) a predicate;
for example:
(67)
The interesting and noteworthy aspect of this analysis of nouns con-
cerns those nouns functioning as arguments – i.e., non-predicatively. Non-
predicative nouns cannot be construed as predicates in syntax, since they
do not take arguments in the manner of predicatively used nouns.
The simple argument nouns in the following sentences cannot be con-
strued as syntactic predicates:
a.(68) The dog chased the cat.
b. The cat ran up the tree.
c. Birds flew out of the tree.
The argument nouns dog, cat, tree, and birds can be construed as seman-
tic predicates insofar as they are properties predicated of entities in the
situational context, but they cannot be construed as syntactic predicates
because they are not predicated of linguistic material in the sentence.13
However, when such nouns appear in apposition, they become predicates;
for example:
(69) Caesar, the dog, chased Nero, the cat.
The NPs the dog and the cat are now given as properties which are predi-
cated of Caesar and Nero, respectively; they have become syntactic pred-
icates.
13 Cf. Higginbotham’s (1985) argument, within a Chomskyan framework, that the de-
terminer saturates the relevant argument slot of the noun through ‘theta-binding’, a
mechanism distinct from the ‘theta-marking’ relation that holds between a predicate
and its syntactic argument(s).
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The importance of the current distinction between semantic and syn-
tactic predicates is most visible with relational nouns that appear with
their semantic arguments; for example:
(70) Caesar’s invasions of Britain occurred in 55–54 BCE.
While it is clear that that the noun invasions is a semantic predicate with
the semantic arguments Caesar and Britain, it is not a syntactic predicate
under the present understanding of predicates. A noun occurring with its
argument(s) can become a syntactic predicate, however, as soon as it is
used predicatively:
(71) These are Caesar’s best soldiers.
The noun phrase Caesar’s best soldiers is now being predicated of the
subject these. The consequence of this observation is that it is not possible
to view invasions as a syntactic predicate in (70), because it is not being
predicated of another part of the sentence.
The following claim about nouns summarizes the observations and
reasoning just produced:
(72) Claim about nouns
Non-predicative nouns are not syntactic predicates.
This aspect of nouns distinguishes them from other word categories.
A given verb or adjective is always (part of) a predicate, and many prepo-
sitions and subordinators can also be used predicatively. This issue is
important for defining the domain that is relevant for the analysis of
polarity-sensitivity. A non-predicative noun does not establish a scope
domain.14
14 Gerunds, which have both noun- and verb-like qualities, are, interestingly, more verb-
like than noun-like according to the central data being explored in this article; for
example:
(i) a. *Reading none of those papers is ever necessary.
b. Reading any of those papers is never necessary.
This acceptability pattern suggests that reading none/any of those papers is a separate
scope domain that is embedded in the greater scope domain. The gerund reading is
hence a syntactic predicate.
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4. Scope
The next two subsections define and illustrate the concept of scope as
understood based on the scope domain, a type of constituent.
4.1. Scope domains
The syntactic constituent that is relevant for capturing aspects of polarity-
sensitivity is called the scope domain:
(73) Scope domain (preliminary version)
The minimal constituent containing a syntactic predicate P and any argument of P
that dominates P .
The innovation here is in the formulation “…any argument of P that dom-
inates P”. By defining the scope domain in this manner – i.e., in terms
of predicates and arguments that dominate them – a unique type of con-
stituent is posited. A predicate that is dominated by one of its arguments
forms a scope domain with that argument.
As one examines the constituents that qualify as scope domains ac-
cording to this definition, one sees that the scope domain overlaps to an
extent with the clause, since a given clause is usually a scope domain.
There are, however, many scope domains that most grammars would not
construe as clauses. Hence the clause is a subtype of scope domain. The
discussion that now follows illustrates this state of affairs by examining
a series of examples. Square brackets are used in this section to delimit
scope domains. Each predicate establishes a scope domain, and this scope
domain is enclosed in square brackets.
Since argument nouns are not syntactic predicates (as established in
section 3.5), they do not establish scope domains. A simple sentence con-
taining a subject noun, a verbal predicate, and an object noun is therefore
just a single scope domain; for example:
(74)
As soon as a noun is modified by a predicate, however, the entire NP
becomes a separate scope domain; for example:
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(75)
The attributive adjective old and the present participle wearing are predi-
cates, so they establish scope domains. Since they are dominated by their
‘subject’ nouns, the scope domains that they establish include these nouns.
Example (75) contains the reduced relative clause wearing a hat. The
relative clause in the following example is not, in contrast, reduced:
(76)
The relative clause that he has prepared is as a whole a predication over
meals, as indicated in (76b). Within this relative clause, the predicate
has prepared takes the argument he (as well as a second argument that
is absent but that corresponds to the object gap), as indicated in (76c).
This example therefore illustrates that one scope domain as a whole can
function as a predication.
Non-finite verbs are often separate predicates. Thus, when a control
verb subcategorizes for another infinitive, participle, or gerund, each es-
tablishes its own scope domain; for example:
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(77)
The auxiliary is and the present participle refusing together form the ma-
trix predicate, thus establishing the matrix scope domain. The participle
takes a to-infinitive valent, which is itself a separate predicate, establishing
its own scope domain. Since the argument of to eat – i.e., the cat – does
not dominate to eat, it is not included in the scope domain established
by to eat. Note that we can know that is refusing and to eat are separate
predicates from the fact that each can be negated; e.g., The cat is not
refusing to eat vs. The cat is refusing not to eat.
Event-oriented adjuncts take the entire matrix clause as their first
argument, so the scope domains that they establish encompass the entire
matrix clause; for example:
(78)
The minimal constituent containing the matrix predicate laughed is the
entire sentence, and since (part of) the first argument of the adjunct prepo-
sition during, which is a separate predicate, dominates during, the scope
domain established by during also encompasses the entire sentence. This
results in a situation in which two coextensive scope domains are present
– in other words, the two completely overlap.
The scope domains established by participant-oriented adjuncts are
quite different. A participant-oriented adjunct is a predication over one of
the matrix arguments, often over the subject. This state of affairs results
in scope domains that are not coextensive:
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(79)
While the matrix subject Sam is also the first argument of the participle
predicate petting, it does not dominate petting. This means that the scope
domain of petting does not extend upward to include the matrix clause; it
is, rather, limited to just the fronted adjunct petting the cat.
4.2. Scope of X
NPIs and their triggers relate to the scope domains that contain them
in an important way. The minimal scope domain containing a given item
does not necessarily delimit the scope of that item. The following examples
illustrate the issue:
(80)
In both of these sentences, the NPI any is contained within the embedded
scope domain established by the adjunct predicate with. This observation
might suggest, incorrectly, that there should be no acceptability contrast
across the two sentences.
Acta Linguistica Academica 65, 2018
Acta Linguistica Academica / p. 148 / March 10, 2018
148 Timothy Osborne & Matthew Reeve
A closer examination of the two sentences reveals the relevant dif-
ference. The NPI any in (80b) is dominated by the prepositional adjunct
predicate with, whereas any in (80a) is not dominated by with. This insight
indicates how NPIs are sensitive to the scope domains that contain them.
The formulation scope ofX is used henceforth to express how the scope of
an item is understood. The following definition holds:
(81) Scope of X (where X is not predicative)
The scope domain established by the first/lowest predicate to directly or indirectly
govern X.
The notion of government appealed to here is that put forth by Tesnière
(1959, ch. 2, 5–7), early in the development of dependency syntax. A given
word directly governs another word if it appears directly above it in the
dependency hierarchy. Most of the time, the head of a given word directly
governs that word. Only when a discontinuity is present are the head
and the governor of a given word distinct – see section 3.2; in particular,
footnote 11. In (80a), the scope of any is the entire sentence because the
first/lowest predicate to govern any is did do, which is the matrix predi-
cate. In (80b), in contrast, the scope of any is the embedded scope domain
because the first/lowest predicate to govern any is the prepositional pred-
icate with.
With this important use of terminology established, the account
can now proceed to demonstrating how the concept of scope just estab-
lished serves as the central notion for discerning the syntactic distribution
of NPIs.
5. Analyses in terms of scope
The next two subsections establish the two main restrictions on the dis-
tribution of predicative, iota-type, and any-type NPIs in relation to their
triggers. These restrictions have to do with containment within the scope
of a trigger and with linearity (as expressed in terms of precedence).
5.1. The Scope Condition
The obvious and most important aspect of scope that helps account
for the distribution of NPIs concerns containment (‘appearance within’):
Acta Linguistica Academica 65, 2018
Acta Linguistica Academica / p. 149 / March 10, 2018
Scope domains 149
(82) Scope Condition
An NPI must appear within the scope of a trigger.
The Scope Condition expresses the basic insight that an NPI must be in the
scope of a trigger.15 This requirement is apparent when considering that
a negation in an embedded clause cannot license an NPI in the matrix
clause (see Jackendoff 1972, 349; Kayne 1994, 24; Lasnik 1999, 40–41,
185; Hoeksema 2000, 123; Lasnik & Uriagereka 2005, 148; O’Grady 2005,
18–19; Uriagereka 2012, 131). In the following examples and henceforth,
the negation’s scope is enclosed in square brackets [ ] – further below, wavy
15 That is, we are assuming that ultimately it is scope in the semantic sense that
licenses NPIs, but that semantic scope is determined on the basis of a syntactic
domain as in (81). The idea that ‘scope of X’ in the sense of (81) – call it syntactic
scope – always maps directly onto semantic scope is of course an oversimplification.
Such simple examples as He didn’t eat at least two dishes that were given to him
demonstrate that scope in the sense of (81) does not always fully determine semantic
scope, as this example is scopally ambiguous. We simply assume that, where the
syntactic scopes of two items X and Y are coextensive, then potentially either may
semantically scope over the other. (This is relevant in our brief discussion of FCIs in
section 2.4.) This could also handle the fact, raised by a reviewer of this paper, that
in Greek, subjunctive relative clauses may host NPIs that precede their licensors,
while indicative relative clauses may not.
(i) a. Enas giatros pou na iksere tipota gia velonismo dhen
a doctor that SUBJ knew anything about acupuncture not
itan diathesimos.
was available
‘A doctor that knew anything about acupuncture was not available.’
b. *Enas giatros pou iksere tipota gia velonismo dhen
a doctor that knew anything about acupuncture not
itan diathesimos.
was available
Given that the NPI in both cases is within the trigger’s syntactic scope (Scope
Condition) and that the NPI’s syntactic scope is in an argument of the predicate
establishing the trigger’s scope (Precedence Condition), we may expect both exam-
ples to be acceptable. We simply assume that, since indicative relatives are unable
to occur in the semantic scope of negation, the subject NP containing the relative
in (ib) must take semantic scope over negation, as it can given that the subject
NP’s syntactic scope is coextensive with the trigger’s syntactic scope. However, this
means that the NPI fails to be licensed, as NPIs must occur in the semantic scope
of their trigger.
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brackets f g are used to delimit the NPI’s scope. The Scope Condition
hence necessitates that the NPI appears within the square brackets:
a.(83) *When [nothing bad happened] anyone was dissatisfied.
b. [No one was dissatisfied when anything bad happened].
a.(84) *The DA proved that [none of the defendants were guilty] during any of the trials.16
b. [The DA proved during none of the trials that any of the defendants was guilty].
a.(85) *Because [no one said they were hungry], anybody brought food.
b. [Nobody brought food because anyone said they were hungry].
From its position in the embedded clause, the negation in the a-sentences
cannot scope out of the embedded clause over the matrix clause. When
the relationship is reversed so that the negation is in the matrix clause
and the NPI is in the embedded clause, as in the b-sentences, the result is
fine. Note that the word order differs across each a- and b-sentence. This is
necessary to satisfy the constraint on the linear ordering of any-type NPIs
in relation to their triggers; this constraint is discussed below.
The Scope Condition helps distinguish between complements and ad-
juncts in NPs; for example:
a.(86) *[The fans wearing no clothes] made any noise.
b. [The fans of no team made any noise].
a.(87) *The author [known to none of us] ever wants to go unread.
b. ?[The author of no linguistics article ever wants it to go unread]. (Kayne 1994, 25)
a.(88) *[The key in nobody’s pocket] can ever open this door.
b. ?[The key to none of these problems has ever been obvious].
(Hoeksema 2000, 141–142)
The acceptability contrast across these examples is a function of the post-
noun dependent – i.e., whether it has complement or adjunct status. The
post-noun PP dependents in the a-sentences can easily be rendered as
relative clauses (e.g., the fans who were wearing no clothes, the author who
is known to none of us, the key that is in nobody’s pocket), which is a mark
of adjuncts. In contrast, the post-noun PPs in the b-sentences cannot be
rendered as such; e.g., *the fans who are of no team, *the author who is
16 Example (84a) is taken from Lasnik & Saito (1991, 12) (see also Lasnik & Uriagereka
2005, 148).
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of no linguistics article, *the key that is to none of these problems. The
post-noun PPs in the a-sentences are hence adjuncts containing separate
scope-domain-establishing predicates.
The Scope Condition is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient
one. This is apparent in simple cases such as *[Anyone has not done that],
where the NPI anyone appears within the scope of a potential trigger but is
not licensed, because it precedes that potential trigger instead of following
it – see the next section. Even in cases where both criteria are met – i.e., the
NPI appears within a potential trigger’s scope and follows that trigger –
triggering can fail. This occurs, for instance, with psychological predicates
(see the examples in footnote 5):17
a.(89) *[It did not upset Jill that anyone had divulged her secret].
b. *[It did not affect John that anyone had stretched the truth].
There are many other types and aspects of polarity items that demon-
strate further that the Scope Condition is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition. These matters are not pursued further here, however (see, e.g.,
Collins & Postal 2014 and Hoeksema 2017 for useful recent discussion).
5.2. The Precedence Condition
The notion of scope established above also serves as the basis for discerning
when an any-type NPI can precede its trigger. To show this, however, it is
first necessary to extend the notion of scope beyond how scope is normally
understood. We now stipulate that in addition to triggers, all lexical items
have scope. Hence a given NPI also takes scope, and its scope is consistent
with the definition of scope of X given above in Section 4.2: the scope
of a given NPI is hence the scope domain established by the first/lowest
predicate to govern that NPI. The manner in which the scope of an NPI
and that of its trigger relate to each other can now be explored.
There are three basic constellations to acknowledge when examining
how an any-type NPI’s scope and its trigger’s scope relate to each other:
17 Following Linebarger (1987), one can perhaps explain the badness of examples like
(89a–b) by acknowledging a negative implicatum evoked by the NPI any in the em-
bedded clauses. The matrix predicates seem to presuppose the truth of their argument
clauses, a fact that contradicts the negative implicatum evoked by any.
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Three scope constellations
A. The scope of the NPI and that of its trigger are coextensive (i.e., they
completely overlap),
B. The two scopes are not coextensive and the NPI’s scope is (contained
in) an argument of the predicate that establishes the trigger’s scope,
or
C. The two scopes are not coextensive and the NPI’s scope is NOT (con-
tained in) an argument of the predicate that establishes the trigger’s
scope.
These three constellations are represented schematically as follows. The
trigger’s scope is indicated with square brackets [ ], and the NPI’s scope
with wavy brackets f g:
(90) Scopes are coextensive (with any-type NPI)
a. [f Trigger NPI g]
b. *[f NPI Trigger g]
(91) Scopes are not coextensive (any-type NPI in an argument)
a. [ Trigger fArg NPI g]
b. [fArg NPI g Trigger ]
(92) Scopes are not coextensive (any-type NPI in an adjunct)
a. [ Trigger fAdj NPI g]
b. *[fAdj NPIg Trigger]
All three constellations are summarized and unified as one condition (in
two parts) on the distribution of non-predicative NPIs (i.e., iota- and any-
type NPIs):
(93) Precedence Condition
i. An iota-type NPI must follow its trigger.
ii. An any-type NPI must follow its trigger unless its scope is (contained in) an
argument of the predicate that establishes a trigger’s scope.
The Precedence Condition captures an aspect of the distribution of non-
predicative NPIs that was noticed early on in investigations of the dis-
tribution of NPIs. Jackendoff (1972, 349–350) posited the ‘left-to-right
condition’, and Ladusaw (1980, 206–207) the ‘left-right order restriction’
– see also Ladusaw (1996, 333). More recently, O’Grady (2005, 18–21) has
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argued against c-command in favor of an account in terms of left-to-right
linear order.
The following sets of examples give the basic cases that the Precedence
Condition captures:
(94) Scopes are coextensive (with any-type NPI)
a. [fNobody said anything to anyoneg].
b. [fHe said nothing to anyoneg].
c. *[fAnybody said nothing to anybodyg].
d. *[fAnybody said anything to nobodyg].
Scopes are not coextensive (with any-type NPI in an argument)
a.(95) I’m sure that [a student had not written the explanation fwho knew anything
about syntaxg].
b. I’m sure that [a student fwho knew anything about syntaxg had not written the
explanation].
a.(96) [It was unexpected that fanyone had actually solved the problemg].
b. [fThat anyone had actually solved the problemg was unexpected].
Scopes are not coextensive (with any-type NPI in an adjunct)
a.(97) [She did not stay because fanyone asked her tog].
b. *[Because fanyone asked her tog, she did not stay].
a.(98) [He did not slow down so that fanyone could understandg].
b. *[So that fanyone could understandg, he did not slow down].
Example (95b) and (96b) are the most noteworthy ones here. In those
examples, the NPI precedes its trigger, yet the sentences are fine. That
any-type NPIs can at times precede their triggers is acknowledged in many
places (e.g., Ross 1967, 282; Ladusaw 1980, 205; Linebarger 1980, 13–14;
Laka 1994, 121; Uribe-Etxebarria 1996; de Swart 1998; Hoeksema 2000,
135–137).
Note that the Precedence Condition has no difficulty with some of the
examples from the introduction that were problematic for the c-command
account. Examples (5a–b) are repeated here as (99a–b), with brackets
added to mark the relevant scopes:
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a.(99) [fNo student’s parent posed any questionsg].
b. [fThe parent of no student posed any questionsg].
In each sentence, the scope of the NPI is coextensive with that of its trigger,
and since the negation precedes the NPI, the sentences are predictably fine.
Examples (4) and (6), which contain event-oriented adjuncts, are repeated
here as (100a) and (101a):
a.(100) [fDuring nobody’s presentation did I say anythingg].
b. *[fI said anything during nobody’s presentationg].
a.(101) [fShe said nothing at any timeg].
b. *[fAt any time, she said nothingg].
The adjunct predicates during and at establish scope domains, and these
scope domains are in addition to the scope domains established by the
matrix predicates say and said. Since these adjuncts are event-oriented,
the matrix clause is the adjunct predicate’s first argument. This extends
the scope domain established by the adjunct predicate over the entire
sentence, resulting in coextensive scopes, which correctly predicts that the
any-type NPI must follow its trigger, for the scope of the one overlaps
completely with the scope of the other.
Like the Scope Condition, the Precedence Condition is a necessary lim-
itation on the distribution of non-predicative NPIs, but it is not a sufficient
one. In other words, there are cases in which the Precedence Condition is
obeyed, yet the appearance of a non-predicative NPI is disallowed.18
18 Further examples that support the idea that the Precedence Condition restricts non-
predicative NPIs include the following ((ia/b) from Heycock & Kroch 2002, 154):
(i) a. *Any firemen weren’t available.
b. What wasn’t/weren’t available was/were any firemen.
c. *Any firemen was/were what wasn’t/weren’t available.
Here it seems clear that the reason why the NPI is licensed in the pseudocleft (ib)
but not in (ia,c) is that it is preceded by its trigger in (ib) but not in (ia). What
remains to be explained about (ib) is why the NPI is licensed despite apparently being
outside the scope of its trigger (the wh-subject). Even under an ellipsis analysis of
pseudoclefts (e.g. Ross 1972; Den Dikken et al. 2000), we do not expect licensing to
succeed here, given the ungrammaticality of *Any fireman weren’t available. We leave
this as a topic for future research.
Acta Linguistica Academica 65, 2018
Acta Linguistica Academica / p. 155 / March 10, 2018
Scope domains 155
5.3. Fronted predicates
An examination of data involving topicalized non-finite predicates, as seen
in examples (9)–(10) in the introduction, has been postponed until now.
The reason for this postponement is that fronted non-finite predicates un-
expectedly behave as though they are separate scope domains. Examples
(9)–(10) are repeated here as (102a–b):
a.(102) …but all that happy, she clearly was not.
b. …but at all satisfied, he obviously was not.
Given the analyses of predicative elements above, happy and was in (102a)
and satisfied and was in (102b) should form a single predicate each time.
This means that they should establish a single scope domain, which pre-
dicts, in turn, that the any-type NPIs all that and at all should, in accor-
dance with the Precedence Condition, not be able to precede the negation.
This prediction is wrong, since (102a–b) are acceptable. What actually
seems to have occurred is that fronting of the adjective phrase has re-
sulted in that phrase becoming an embedded scope domain with argument
status.19
The problem is illustrated further with the following data:
a.(103) I definitely did not drink any beer.
b. *…but any beer, I definitely did not drink.
c. …but drink any beer, I definitely did not.20
As the account stands, the Precedence Condition correctly predicts that
the non-predicative NPI any cannot precede the trigger not in (103b).
However, the Precedence Condition incorrectly predicts (103c) to also be
bad because the matrix predicate did drink/drink…did has not changed,
19 This resembles Adger’s (2013) proposal, in a different empirical context, that the verb
and auxiliary in VP-fronting constructions head two distinct ‘extended projections’
(in the sense of Grimshaw 1991).
20 Our judgment for sentence (103c) stands in contrast to Laka’s (1994, 124) judgments
for such cases. Laka takes the following examples to be unacceptable:
(i) a. *Buy any records she hasn’t.
b. *Buy any records is what she refused to do.
We think that the acceptability of (ia) increases markedly if the negation is em-
phasized and the participial form of the verb is used (…but bought any records, she
definitely has not), and, concerning (ib), we simply disagree with Laka’s acceptability
judgment: for us, (ib) is fine.
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the same words being present. What seems to have occurred is that the
fronting of the non-finite VP drink any beer has resulted in that VP gaining
the status of an embedded argument scope domain.
Assuming that this is correct – i.e., that the fronted non-finite AP/VP
has gained the status of an embedded argument scope domain – examples
(102a–b) receive the following analyses:
a.(104) …but [fall that happyg, she clearly was not].
b. …but [fat all satisfiedg, he obviously was not].
a.(105) [fI definitely did not drink any beerg].
b. *…but [fany beer, I definitely did not drinkg].
c. …but [fdrink any beerg, I definitely did not].
While these analyses seem to be on the right track inasmuch as the scope
domains shown are now congruent with what the Precedence Condition
predicts, no independent evidence has been produced that motivates the
presence of the embedded scope domains indicated. In other words, there
is no obvious reason why such fronted non-finite predicates should consti-
tute embedded scope domains, nor why they should have argument status.
Putting aside the question of independent evidence for the moment,
note that there are further data supporting the stipulation that the fronted
non-finite APs and VPs have the status of embedded argument scope
domains:
a.(106) [I would definitely drink no beer].
b. …but [no beer would I drink]
c. *…but [drink no beer] would I definitely.
d. [fI would definitely not drink any beerg].
e. *…but [drink no beer], I would definitely.
The fronted expression no beer elicits negative inversion in (106b), which
is congruent with the presence of the single scope domain indicated. In
(106c), in contrast, the fronted non-finite VP fails to elicit negative in-
version, which is consistent with the analysis shown because the fronted
non-finite VP is an embedded scope domain that the negation’s scope
does not reach out of. Sentence (106d) is truth-conditionally equivalent
to sentence (106a), which is consistent with the single scope domain or
coextensive scope domains analyses shown in those two examples.
The badness of (106e) is unexpected, since there is no apparent reason
why the non-finite VP containing no should not be frontable. Observe,
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however, that if drink no beer is an embedded scope domain as shown, then
there is no expectation that (106e) would be truth-conditionally equivalent
to (106d), due to the mismatching scope domains – one scope domain in
(106d), but potentially two in (106e). It seems likely in this regard that
the grammar simply has no means of assigning (106e) an interpretation,
due to the fact that the presence of the embedded scope domain ensures
that no beer cannot be equivalent in meaning to not…any beer in (106d).
With these further considerations in mind, the best analysis of fronted
non-finite predicative phrases is that they do indeed qualify as embedded
argument scope domains. To accommodate this aspect of the data, the cur-
rent account emphasizes the monostratal nature of the greater approach
to syntax assumed – see the fourth principle in section 3.1. A monostratal
syntax that takes hierarchical and linear organization to both be primitive
can appeal to, and build on, the production and processing of syntactic
structures in time. Scope domains are produced and processed in time as
they are spoken or heard (or read: from left to right in languages that are
written from left to right and from right to left in languages that are writ-
ten from right to left; see Osborne et al. 2011 and Osborne 2012). Once
a word appears that potentially establishes a scope domain, the gram-
mar indeed creates a space for that predicate word as a scope domain.
Fronted non-finite predicative adjectives and verbs therefore establish sep-
arate scope domains.
An addendum is now added to the definition of the scope domain to
accommodate the data and points discussed in this section:
(107) Scope domain (final version)
The minimal constituent containing (part of) a syntactic predicate P (that is not
preceded and dominated by any other part of P ) and any argument of P that domi-
nates P .
With the addenda in parentheses – i.e., (part of) and (that is not pre-
ceded and dominated by any other part of P) – the definition now identifies
fronted non-finite APs and VPs as embedded scope domains. A further
stipulation is also necessary, namely that these embedded scope domains
have argument status in relation to the encompassing scope domain estab-
lished by the following auxiliary verb.
The next trees illustrate how this expanded definition of the scope
domain is understood:
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(108)
The relevant difference across these two structures is that the non-finite
verb drink in (108a) is preceded and dominated by will, the two words
together forming one predicate. According to the definition, this means
that drink alone does not establish a separate, embedded scope domain.
In (108b), in contrast, drink is not preceded and dominated by will, so
it does establish a separate scope domain. As soon as drink is uttered in
(108b), drink alone acquires scope-domain-establishing status because no
other word has yet been uttered that could be construed as forming a
predicate with it. The greater observation, then, is that scope domains are
being established in real time in an online manner as (part of) a predicate
is produced or perceived.
6. Additional issues
The following subsections consider additional sources of support for the
account above in terms of scope domains and the definition of scope more
generally.
6.1. Negative inversion
The scope domain unit helps predict when negative inversion does and
does not occur. When a negation precedes the subject and finite verb in
a clause and the scopes of the negation and the subject are coextensive,
negative inversion must occur. If the two scopes involved are not coexten-
sive, however, negative inversion does not occur. This state of affairs is
demonstrated here first using event-oriented adjuncts:
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a.(109) [Sam dances under no circumstances].
b. [Under no circumstances does Sam dance].
c. *[Under no circumstances, Sam dances].
a.(110) [Bill drinks alcohol before no social events].
b. [Before no social events does Bill drink alcohol].
c. *[Before no social events, Bill drinks alcohol].
Since the negation in these examples is in a phrasal event-oriented adjunct,
its scope encompasses the entire sentence. This necessitates that subject-
auxiliary inversion occur.
When the negation is embedded in a clausal event-oriented adjunct,
in contrast, the scope of the negation does not extend out of the embedded
clause over the matrix clause:
a.(111) Sam never dances because [he has no self-confidence].
b. *Because [he has no self-confidence] does Sam never dance.
c. Because [he has no self-confidence], Sam never dances.
a.(112) Bill avoids pubs when [he has no money].
b. *When [he has no money] does Bill avoid pubs.
c. When [he has no money], Bill avoids pubs.
The scope of the negation in these examples is limited to the adjunct
clause. The scope of the negation therefore does not reach over the matrix
subject and finite verb, so negative inversion in the matrix clause does
not occur.
The first acceptability pattern (examples (109)–(110)) occurs again
when the negation is (part of) an argument of the matrix predicate (but
not contained within an adjunct in that argument); for example:
a.(113) [Jill has understood none of the explanations].
b. [None of the explanations has Jill understood].
c. *[None of the explanations, Jill has understood].
a.(114) [I would send my dog to no dog school].
b. [To no dog school would I send my dog].
c. *[To no dog school, I would send my dog].
A single predicate, the matrix predicate, is present in each of these exam-
ples – the preposition to introduces an argument of the matrix predicate,
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as opposed to an adjunct, which means that it is not a separate predi-
cate. This situation sees the scope of the negation encompassing the entire
sentence.
The next examples involve phrasal participant-oriented adjuncts:
a.(115) ?Susan was actually quite happy, [in love with no one].
b. *[In love with no one] was Susan actually quite happy.
c. [In love with no one], Susan was actually quite happy.
a.(116) James has finally given up, [tired of getting no support].
b. *[Tired of getting no support] has James finally given up.
c. [Tired of getting no support], James has finally given up.
The adjuncts in these cases cannot be viewed as clausal, in part because
they lack a finite verb. Despite this fact, the negations do not scope out
of the adjuncts over the matrix clauses. They do not do so because, as
participant-oriented adjuncts, they are predications over a participant, in
these cases over the subject, and their scopes are therefore limited to the
adjuncts.
6.2. German
The account of NPI distribution above can be extended to other languages.
In this section, some data from German is considered, data of the sort dis-
cussed by Hinterhölzl (2006) and Richter & Soehn (2006). Despite the
freer word order associated with scrambling in German, the Scope Condi-
tion and Precedence Condition hold in the same manner that they do in
English. The data examined next involve VP-fronting in matrix clauses,
clause-fronting, and scrambling in subordinate clauses. The same distribu-
tion of non-predicative NPIs seen above in English repeats itself in German.
The V2 principle of German (and other Germanic languages) is such
that the position immediately preceding the finite verb in matrix declar-
ative clauses can be occupied by most any phrasal constituent. An object
phrase, for instance, can easily precede the finite verb, causing the subject
phrase to follow the finite verb; e.g., Er hat bestimmt alles gesagt ‘He cer-
tainly said everything’ → Alles hat er bestimmt gesagt ‘He certainly said
everything’. It is even possible for a nonfinite verb together with its object
to occupy the first position; e.g., Alles gesagt hat er bestimmt ‘He cer-
tainly said everything’. This fundamental aspect of word order in German
allows one to test the Precedence Condition well.
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The following data set tests the Precedence Condition using the any-
type NPI auch nur irgendetwas ‘anything’. The predictions the Precedence
Condition makes are borne out:
(117)
Sentences (117a–c) illustrate the standard pattern: the NPI should follow
the negation. Sentence (117d), in contrast, demonstrates that the NPI can
precede the negation if the participle is fronted together with it, as the
NPI and participle together make up a separate scope domain. This is,
assuming that the NPI is a dependent of the participle as shown in (117a),
exactly as the Precedence Condition predicts.
The prediction concerning a non-predicative NPI in a subordinate
clause is that it should be able to precede a negation in the main clause.
This prediction is also borne out:
a.(118) *[fAuch nur irgendetwas wurde nicht gestohleng].
even only anything was not stolen
‘*Anything was not stolen.
b. [Dass fer auch nur irgendetwas gestohlen hatg,
that he even only anything stolen has
wurde nie bewiesen].
was never proved
‘That he had stolen anything was never proved.’
Sentence (118a) illustrates again the inability of a non-predicative NPI
to be fronted on its own. When it appears in an argument clause as in
(118b), though, the argument clause can be fronted. The brackets continue
to indicate how these cases are interpreted. The acceptable (118b) has the
NPI’s scope properly contained inside the negation’s scope.
The account predicts that in the middle field (Ger. Mittelfeld) in sub-
ordinate clauses, the NPI should not be able to precede the negation. This
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is indeed the case, as the following examples taken from Richter & Soehn
(2006, 425) demonstrate:
a.(119) weil [fer nicht auch nur irgendetwas gesagt hatg]
because he not even only anything said has
‘because he has not said anything’
b. *weil [fer auch nur irgendetwas nicht gesagt hatg]
Scrambling in the middle field in these cases does not involve an embedded
argument scope domain, hence the NPI cannot precede the negation. If the
scope of the NPI is (or is contained in) an embedded argument, however,
the NPI can precede the negation; for example:
(120) weil [er einen Autor fder auch nur irgendetwas schreibtg
because he an author who even only anything writes
nicht kennt]
not knows
‘because he doesn’t know an author who is writing anything’
In this case, the relative clause modifies an argument noun, which means
that the relative clause is a scope domain that is in an argument of the
matrix predicate.
In light of the examples from German examined in this section, the
current account of NPI distribution can claim validity beyond English.
The value of the German data lies in particular in the freer word order of
German. Despite this freer word order, the Precedence Condition remains
valid and helps predict when an any-type NPI can precede its trigger.
7. Conclusion
This paper has endeavored to clarify the syntactic relationship between
NPIs and their triggers. The discussion began with demonstrations of the
inability of c-command to capture this relationship. C-command (either
on the surface or at LF) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
on the distribution of NPIs. In place of the c-command restriction, a DG
account has been presented that examines scope domains in order to iden-
tify the factors that determine the syntactic relationship between NPIs
and their triggers.
The DG catena plays an important role, since by acknowledging cate-
nae, one can discern the presence of predicates and their arguments in
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syntactic structures in a concrete way. This, in turn, is what has made it
possible to identify scope domains. Equipped with the scope domain, two
conditions on the distribution of NPIs have been identified. The highlights
of the account are repeated here again to provide a concluding overview:
(121) Scope domain
The minimal constituent containing (part of) a syntactic predicate P (that is not
preceded and dominated by any other part of P ) and any argument of P that domi-
nates P .
(122) Scope Condition
An NPI must appear within a trigger’s scope.
(123) Precedence Condition
i. An iota-type NPI must follow its trigger.
ii. An any-type NPI must follow its trigger unless its scope is (contained in) an
argument of the predicate that establishes a trigger’s scope.
The two conditions on the distribution of NPIs are necessary, but not
sufficient. Indeed, there are numerous aspects of polarity licensing (e.g.,
intervention effects; see, e.g., Guerzoni 2006) and idiosyncrasies of vari-
ous licensors and licensees that have been ignored in this contribution.
However, we are aware of no clear exceptions to our claim that the two
conditions are necessary.
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